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MORTGAGES-DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSE:
RESTRAINT ON ALIENATION-ENFORCEABILITY
EDITOR'S NOTE: A Michigan appellate Court has recently
adopted a flexible approach for determining whether due-on-
sale clauses in mortgage agreements are invalid and unen-
forceable as unreasonable restraints upon alienation. The
first author, in submitting the decision to a traditional case
analysis, concludes that embracing this approach was in-
novative and beneficial as a means of balancing the interests
of mortgagor and lender. The contrasting piece more pessi-
mistically suggests that the practical result of a flexible test
may be a high degree of uncertainty, inconsistent treatment
between federal and state institutions, and ultimately
economic disadvantage borne primarily by the very borrow-
er whom the approach was meant to assist.
Nichols v. Ann Arbor Federal Savings & Loan Association,
73 Mich. App. 163, 250 N.W.2d 804,
appeal denied, 400 Mich. 844 (1977).
In recent years, controversy has developed over the validity of
mortgage due-on-sale provisions because they are claimed to un-
reasonably restrain alienation.l Such provisions typically provide that
the mortgagee may declare the entire balance of the loan and its
accrued interest due and payable immediately upon transfer or other
change in the ownership of the mortgaged property. While these
clauses operate to protect the interests of the mortgagee, they may also
threaten the fundamental rights of the mortgagor-homeowner to freely
alienate his property. Nichols v. Ann Arbor Federal Savings & Loan
Association,2 while adopting the general approach of viewing the due-
on-sale clause as a restraint on alienation, applied a less conventional,
"flexible" 3 test to determine whether the restraint involved was un-
reasonable, and thus unenforceable. In doing so, the Michigan Court
1. See generally Annot., 69 A.L.R.3d 725 (1976). For a compilation of related
secondary treatments, see Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 629,
224 S.E.2d 580, 586 (1976).
2. 73 Mich. App. 163, 250 N.W.2d 804, appeal denied, 400 Mich. 844 (1977).
3. Id. at 168, 250 N.W.2d at 806.
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of Appeals took an important step toward a more logical and sensible
approach to the judicial scrutiny of due-on-sale clauses.
The defendant in Nichols held a mortgage on property owned by
Mr. and Mrs. Kempf. The mortgage contained a due-on-sale clause
which provided for acceleration of the mortgage debt in the event of
the transfer of the property by the mortgagors. The Kempfs entered
into an installment land contract for the sale of the property to the
Nichols, whereupon the defendant accelerated the mortgage indebted-
ness and commenced foreclosure proceedings when the entire loan was
not repaid. Both parties to the land contract brought actions to perma-
nently enjoin foreclosure, and, after consolidation for trial, were
awarded summary judgment by the trial court. The court of appeals
affirmed,4 and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.5
Traditionally, judicial disdain for restraints on alienation has been
applied exclusively to "direct restraints," classified into three major
categories: disabling, forfeiture, and promissory. 6 The Nichols court
properly recognized that the due-on-sale clause "[s]trictly speaking,
• . .does not fit within the definition of a [direct] restraint on aliena-
tion,'" 7 but agreed with a commentator's conclusion that it "is so
closely akin to the promissory restraint as to justify designating it a
direct restraint." 8 Even though a transfer of the property does not
breach the mortgage agreement, the mortgagor's immediate obligation
can be increased by the mortgagee from the amount of a periodic
payment to the entire amount of the loan, a result not unlike a default
on a covenant not to convey (a promissory restraint). 9
In addition, when viewed on a practical level, a due-on-sale clause
in a mortgage or deed of trust may restrict alienability by limiting the
mortgagor to certain types of conveyances, or to a sale at a price
significantly less than that which he would otherwise be able to obtain,
and may permit the mortgagee to "effectively veto a proposed sale" 10
by exercising his power to accelerate whenever he disapproves of a
4. Id. at 165, 250 N.W.2d at 805.
5. 400 Mich. 844 (1977).
6. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 404 (1944). See Volkmer, The Application of the
Restraints on Alienation Doctrine to Real Property Security Interests, 58 IOWA L. REV.
747, 752-53 (1973).
7. 73 Mich. App. at 165, 250 N.W.2d at 805.
8. Volkmer, supra note 6, at 773-74, quoted in Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163, 166, 250 N.W.2d 804, 806, appeal denied, 400 Mich. 844
(1977).
9. See Volkmer, supra note 6, at 774.
10. Comment, Judicial Treatment of the Due-on-Sale Clause: The Case for Adopting
Standards of Reasonableness and Unconscionability, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1109, l i
(1975).
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given transferee. This is especially true during periods of rising interest
rates. If the purchaser is unable to gain the advantage of the lower
interest rate in the original security agreement, he will probably offer
the mortgagor-vendor less for the property to offset the higher interest
payments which he will be forced to make pursuant to a new or
amended financing agreement, often made with the mortgagee in
exchange for a waiver of the right to accelerate the original obligation.
Equally important, the mortgagor's options may be reduced to transfer
by outright sale only, rather than by installment land contract or other
financing method, as only the first will likely supply sufficient pro-
ceeds to pay off the entire original obligation.
Two of the cases cited by Nichols as representative of those
jurisdictions which have held that the due-on-sale clause operates as a
restraint on alienation, Coast Bank v. Minderhoutn and Baker v.
Loves Park Savings & Loan Association ,12 have been considered
authorities for the per se approach. In each case the court held that the
mortgagee's interest in protecting his security from waste and the risk
of default in payment of the mortgage installments was a reasonable
justification for the per se validity and enforcement of such restraints
without regard to individual circumstances. 13
11. 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964).
12. 61 Ill. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d 1 (1975).
13. See Comment, supra note 10, at 1121. The Coast Bank opinion, written by
Justice Traynor, has been especially influential. The court held that:
The protection of several . . . interests has been recognized as justifying
reasonable restraints on alienation. . . . In the present case it was not un-
reasonable for [the bank] to condition its continued extension of credit to the
[mortgagors] on their retaining their interest in the property that stood as
security for the debt.
61 Cal. 2d at 316-17, 392 P.2d at 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 508. The court did not, however,
articulate precisely what interests of the mortgagee would justify the conceded restraint
on alienation imposed by the due-on-sale clause. As a result, conflicting lines of authori-
ty have developed since the 1964 opinion. There are now widely differing explanations as
to what kinds of circumstances would justify a finding that the restraint is reasonable.
Coast Bank is frequently read as standing for the rule that a due-on-sale clause is
"reasonable per se" absent a showing of fraud, duress, or other inequitable or uncon-
scionable conduct on the part of the lender. E.g., Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 629, 224 S.E.2d 580, 587 (1976).
A second line of post-Coast Bank cases maintains that the lender's interest in bene-
fiting from rising interest rates justifies enforcement of the clause, thus permitting the
lender to "take advantage of higher interest rates in the event his borrower transfers the
security. This is merely one of the ways taken to minimize risks by sensible lenders."
Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 301, 509 P.2d 1240, 1244
(1973). Accord, Cherry v. Home Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574,61 Cal. Rptr.
135 (1969) (lender's interest in maintaining favorable interest rates justifies enforcement
of due-on-sale clause); Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973) (exercise of due-
on-sale clause held not unconscionable or inequitable, since it merely gave the benefit of
increased interest rates to mortgagee rather than to mortgagor). See Miller v. Pacific
First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 86 Wash. 2d 401, 545 P.2d 546 (1976) (provision in
mortgage agreement giving mortgagee right to increase interest rate on loan upon trans-
1978]
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In dismissing the per se approach to restraints on alienation, 14 the
Nichols court adopted a flexible approach for determining the validity
of due-on-sale clauses. Under this theory, the restraint "will not be
enforced unless it is found to be reasonable in a particular case."' 15
This rule had been fashioned in earlier cases involving the enforcement
of nonassignment provisions in installment land contracts. 16 The
Nichols court found "no appreciable difference" between nonassign-
ment provisions and due-on-sale clauses. 17 Although the equitable title
of the land contract vendee (derived from his equity of redemption)
differs theoretically from the legal title of the real property mortgagor,
there appears to be no logical basis for distinguishing the two interests
in the context of restraints on alienation. Similarly, the protections
afforded to the mortgagor from application of the clause should not
depend upon whether the lien theory or title theory of mortgages is
followed. 18
fer by original mortgagor held valid and enforceable). See also text accompanying notes
27, 42-44 infra. But see text accompanying note 37 infra. For a collection of additional
cases following Coast Bank, see Annot., 69 A.L.R.3d 725 (1976).
Baker is representative of yet another interpretation of Coast Bank. Baker focussed
on the reasonableness of protecting the security interest of the lender rather than judging
the equities of enforcing the lender's desire to maintain current, higher interest rates.
The court held that: "It [is] completely justifiable. . . to prohibit the alienation, without
the consent of the lender, of property which stands as security for the debt to a person
whose personal and financial qualities are unknown to and were never considered by the
lender in making the loan." 61 111. 2d at 125, 333 N.E.2d at 4. The Baker court was
perhaps mistaken in its reliance upon Coast Bank for the determination that "the
protection of the lender's security interest . .. must determine the validity of the
restraint and not the circumstances of each particular case." Id. at 126, 333 N.E.2d at 5.
While Coast Bank did not speak to particular circumstances in its holding, it did not
dismiss them. In effect, Baker gives the lender absolute discretion to determine whether
the particular transaction calls for enforcement of the due-on-sale clause. Such a result
was expressly rejected in La Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489
P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971) (enforceability of due-on-encumbrance clause de-
pends upon circumstances of asserted threat to security). In La Sala, the California
court refused to "rule upon the validity of a due-on-encumbrance clause in the ab-
stract." Id. at 882, 489 P.2d at 1124, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 860. See also Tucker v. Lassen Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974); text accompany-
ing notes 19-27 infra. The lender in Nichols did not assert waste or any threat to its
security interest, either in the particular case, or "in the abstract." Thus, consideration
of a possible threat to its security was precluded, leaving its interest in maintaining
favorable, current interest rates as the sole justification proffered for enforcement of the
clause.
14. 73 Mich. App. at 168-70, 250 N.W.2d at 806-07.
15. Id. at 168, 250 N.W.2d at 806.
16. Id. at 167, 250 N.W.2d at 806. See Lemon v. Nicolai, 33 Mich. App. 646, 190
N.W.2d 549 (1971); Pellerito v. Weber, 22 Mich. App. 242, 177 N.W.2d 236 (1970).
17. 73 Mich. App. at 167, 250 N.W.2d at 806.
18. See Leipziger, The Mortgagee's Remedies for Waste, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1086,
1118 (1976).
[Vol. 28:493
DUE-ON-SALE CLA USE
The court embraced the California view, established in Tucker v.
Lassen Savings & Loan Association. 19 Tucker involved plaintiff-
mortgagors who entered into an installment land contract with a subse-
quent purchaser. When the defendant-mortgagee elected to enforce the
due-on-sale provision in the mortgage agreement, the purchaser
avoided a foreclosure sale by agreeing with the bank to assume the
outstanding loan at a higher interest rate in consideration for a waiver
of the mortgagee's right to enforce the clause. In addition, the mort-
gagors were obligated to execute a quitclaim deed.20 On these facts,
the California Supreme Court held the due-on-sale clause unenforce-
able, as an unreasonable restraint on alienation. In so doing, the court
affirmed the award of damages in the amount of the difference between
the balance due under the installment land contract and that remaining
on the original mortgage obligation. 21 In applying the flexible ap-
proach, the court declared that to successfully enforce the due-on-sale
clause, the mortgagee must:
demonstrate a threat to one of his legitimate interests suffi-
cient to justify the restraint on alienation inherent in...
[the due-on-sale clause's] enforcement. Such legitimate in-
terests include not only that of preserving the security from
waste or depreciation but also that of guarding against...
the "moral risks" of having to resort to the security upon
default. 22
In Nichols, as in Tucker, the defendant made no allegations that
his security was being wasted, impaired, or lost.23 In addition, it seems
likely that the Kempfs had not received payments from the purchaser
sufficient to pay off the entire remaining obligation, since the land
contract had been executed only six months after execution of the
mortgage. The facts of Nichols parallel those of Tucker, which also
involved the execution of an installment land contract within months of
the initial mortgage. 24 Thus, in each case, the "quantum of restraint-
that is, the actual practical effect upon alienation which would result
from enforcement of the restraint"5 upon the transfer by installment
19. 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
20. Id. at 632-33, 526 P.2d at 1170-71, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 634-35.
21. Id. at 635, 526 P.2d at 1172, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 634-35.
22. Id. at 639, 526 P.2d at 1175, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639. The term "moral risks" here
refers to the likelihood of having to retake the property, indicated by the poor credit of
the borrower or the foreseeability of waste. Hetland, Real Property and Real Property
Security: The Well-Being of the Law, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 151, 170 (1965).
23. Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163, 174, 250
N.W.2d 804, 809 (1977); Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 640, 526
P.2d 1169, 1176, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633, 640 (1974).
24. 12 Cal. 3d at 632-33, 526 P.2d at 1170-71, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 634-35.
25. Id. at 636, 526 P.2d at 1173, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 637 (emphasis original).
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land contract-would be of "very considerable proportions." 26
It was on this basis that the Nichols court followed the California
Supreme Court27 in rejecting the "money market" rationale for en-
forcement of due-on-sale clauses.2 8 Under this rationale, the mort-
gagee's reasonable interest in maintaining his lending portfolio at
current interest rates justifies the restraint imposed upon mortgagors.
This practice is said to be justified because it accommodates the
lender's reasonable interest in profiting from changes in business
conditions (so as to stabilize current mortgage rates for new borrow-
ers), and because it creates the potential for higher returns which the
mortgagee (typically a savings and loan association) can thereby afford
to give to its investors.
Where a due-on-sale clause is coupled with a prepayment penalty,
the money market justification is especially suspect. It is inconsistent
for a defendant-mortgagee who claims that he has a legitimate interest
in benefiting from a rise in interest rates to also claim that it is fair to
enforce a prepayment penalty when interest rates fall. If it is rea-
sonable for the mortgagee to protect his option to relend at higher
rates, then it would seem equally reasonable for the mortgagor to pay
off the loan in advance, and take a new mortgage available at lower
interest rates. Thus, in Crockett v. First Federal Savings & Loan
Association,29 the court upheld enforcement of the due-on-sale clause
as a reasonable restraint on alienation in part because of the lack of a
prepayment penalty provision. 30
In Nichols, on the other hand, the note did provide for a prepay-
ment penalty. Although the court mentioned this fact in order to
26. Id. at 637, 526 P.2d at 1174, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
27. 73 Mich. App. at 171-74, 250 N.W.2d at 808-09. In a footnote, the Tucker court
had expressly overruled its earlier decision in Cherry v. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n, 276
Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1969), to the extent that Cherry had upheld the due-
on-sale clause on the money market rationale. The court stated that:
Whatever cogency this argument may retain concerning the relatively mild
restraint involved in the case of an outright sale . . . , it lacks all force in the
case of the serious and extreme restraint which would result from the automatic
enforcement of "due-on" clauses in the context of installment land contracts.
12 Cal. 3d at 639 n. 10, 526 P.2d at 1175-76 n. 10, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639-40 n. 10. Without
impugning the logic of the money market rationale, the court stated that the unreason-
ableness of requiring full payment of the loan in the context of an installment land
contract outweighed the reasonableness of the mortgagee's interest in maintaining its
portfolio: "To the degree that enforcement of the clause would result in an increased
quantum of actual restraint on alienation in the particular case, a greater justification for
such enforcement from the standpoint of the lender's legitimate interests will be required
in order to warrant enforcement." Id. at 636, 526 P.2d at 1173, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 637
(emphasis added).
28. See Comment, supra note 10, at 1124.
29. 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976).
30. Id. at 626, 224 S.E.2d at 585.
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distinguish Crockett, the Nichols court simply stated in its conclusion
that "under the facts of the present case, we, as did the California
Supreme Court in Tucker, find the money market argument unpersua-
sive. '" 31 Since Tucker did not discuss the effect of a prepayment
penalty provision on the money market rationale, and the Nichols
court considered the ability to prepay without penalty to be a "weak
argument" 32 in any case, one might reasonably conclude that the
provision for a prepayment penalty was unimportant to the court's
decision. Nevertheless, this factual difference between Nichols and
Tucker renders Nichols a stronger case for the invalidity of the due-
on-sale clause. 33
More significant than the factual distinctions in Nichols, is the
remedy adopted by the court: a permanent injunction against foreclo-
sure proceedings. In Tucker, and in the only post-Tucker case (aside
from Nichols) which has held the due-on-sale clause to be an un-
reasonable restraint on alienation, DeMey v. Joujon-Roche,34 damages
were awarded. In the latter case, the defendant's attempt to enforce a
due-on-sale clause in the deed of trust caused the plaintiffs' prospec-.
tive sale to fail entirely. The court relied on Tucker in awarding the
31. 73 Mich. App. at 174, 250 N.W.2d at 809.
32. Id. at 172, 250 N.W.2d at 808.
33. An additional factual difference between Nichols and Tucker is that the due-on-
sale clause in Tucker began: "To PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THIS DEED OF TRUST, TRUSTOR
AGREES: .... .." 12 Cal. 3d at 632 n.3, 526 P.2d at 1171 n.3, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 635 n.3.
Additionally, plaintiffs executed a "Borrower's Statement of Understanding" which
stated that:
We understand that your loan committee has approved this loan not only
because they consider the property adequate security, but also because of our
credit rating. Therefore, should we sell or transfer the property ...the
Association reserves the right to . . .declare the entire sum owing due and
payable.
12 Cal. 3d at 632-33 n.3, 526 P.2d at 1171 n.3, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 635 n.3. Each of these
phrases suggests that the purpose of the due-on-sale clause was to protect against waste
or impairment of the security, or default by the particular trustor, and not against a rise
in interest rates. The defendant's acceptance of the purchasers under the land contract
as periodic tenants of the trustor for approximately ten months prior to their purchase
indicates that it certainly did not consider that the transfer jeopardized its security. (The
court here cites a memorandum of decision of the trial court which stated that: "[T]he
provisions of [the 'due-on' clause] would certainly apply to leasing of the property." Id.
at 631 n.4, 526 P.2d at 1171 n.4, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 635 n.4). Furthermore, legislation
effective in California when Tucker was decided prohibited deficiency judgments
against the mortgagor. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b (West 1976). See Comment, supra
note 10, at 1115. Thus, the financial worth of the particular mortgagor was irrelevant to
the protection of the mortgagee's interests in the event of foreclosure.
In Nichols, not only were there no allegations of waste or of increase in the "moral
risks" of having to foreclose, but there was no evidence which might support either of
these allegations even if they had been made. Furthermore, there was no indication that
enforcement of the due-on-sale clause was to be limited to special circumstances.
34. 133 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1976) (opinion omitted at 63 Cal. App. 3d 178).
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plaintiffs damages in an amount equal to their expected profit from the
sale. The DeMey court noted that the property was desert land, and
thus not susceptible to waste. For this reason, it was unreasonable to
enforce the clause upon what was essentially an installment sale, solely
to maintain the defendant's lending portfolio. 35
In Tucker, attempted enforcement of the due-on-sale clause forced
an alternate method of sale, while in DeMey, the trustor's sale failed
completely. Thus, damages was the only appropriate remedy in both
cases, since the suits were brought after-the-fact. In Nichols, on the
other hand, the plaintiffs brought suit seeking relief before the transac-
tion was altered or abandoned. By virtue of the court's award of an
injunction against foreclosure, this case was the first in which a court's
finding that a due-on-sale clause constituted an unreasonable, and
therefore invalid, restraint on alienation actually had the effect of
preventing its enforcement. In granting equitable relief, the Nichols
court did not require the plaintiffs to make any special showing of
irreparable harm or inadequate legal remedy. Thus, the case may also
stand for the proposition that in cases involving due-on-sale clauses,
equitable relief will be available without any showing beyond what
would be needed to support a claim for damages.
Nichols also addressed the contention that the due-on-sale clause
can be justified as a disguised variable interest rate mortgage. Since a
variable interest rate clause is generally a valid device for the lender
automatically to take advantage of fluctuations in the money market
structure, 36 it can be argued that the due-on-sale clause should be
enforceable. The court distinguished the due-on-sale clause from the
variable interest rate clause upheld in Miller v. Pacific First Federal
Savings & Loan Association, 3 by stressing that the ordinary mort-
gagor would assume that the provision was intended only to protect the
mortgagee's security, absent some effective disclosure to the
contrary. 38 This criticism seems quite plausible and proper, and obvi-
ously adds to the unreasonableness of the restraint. It should also be
noted that in a more recent Washington case, Bellingham First Federal
Savings & Loan Association v. Garrison,39 the court carefully distin-
35. Id at 572.
36. Comment, supra note 10, at 1125, 1130 & n.99. It should be noted, however, that
such provisions are illegal in Michigan. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 438.31c(2) (Supp. 1976).
37. 86 Wash. 2d 401, 545 P.2d 546 (1976).
38. The court discussed the strong dissent in Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976), which pointed out that the clause's true
purpose would not be apparent to the ordinary reader. 73 Mich. App. at 172-73, 250
N.W.2d at 808-09.
39. 87 Wash. 2d 437, 553 P.2d 1090 (1976).
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guished between variable interest rate provisions and due-on-sale
clauses, applying the Tucker rule of reasonableness to the latter. n0
The element of disclosure would seem to be a major criterion in
those jurisdictions which do not treat the due-on-sale clause as auto-
matically invalid.41 In Gunther v. White,42 for example, the court
found a change in interest rates to be a sufficient justification for
acceleration, 43 but stated in dicta that inequitable conduct on the part of
the mortgagee would relieve a borrower from operation of the clause.44
In upholding the enforcement, the court, in the words of one commen-
tator, notably "found sufficient evidence to infer intent on the part of
the borrower to allow the lender to take advantage of the change in
money-market conditions." 45 In addition, it has been suggested that a
failure to inform the mortgagor at the time of the original transaction
that the due-on-sale clause is to be used to extract a higher rate from a
purchaser involves an element of unfair surprise. 46
In jurisdictions accepting the Nichols (or Tucker) approach, the
element of disclosure can be treated as simply another factor to be
weighed in determining the reasonableness of enforcing the due-on-
sale clause in the particular circumstances. That is, the flexible ap-
proach used in Nichols can incorporate the notice factor just as well as
such factors as the existence of a prepayment penalty provision, the
type of sale entered into by the mortgagor, the ratio of the outstanding
indebtedness to the value of the secured property, the past credit record
and job status of the mortgagor's vendee, and the general real estate
market conditions.
The adoption of the flexible approach by other jurisdictions in the
40. Id. at 440-41, 553 P.2d at 1091-92. The court upheld enforcement of the due-on-
sale clause on the facts of the case, however, because the mortgagor's vendee was a poor
credit risk. Id. at 442, 553 P.2d at 1092-93.
41. Some jurisdictions which do not view the due-on-sale clause as a restraint on
alienation instead evaluate the clause under the penalty doctrine. This doctrine states
that a court of equity will not enforce a penalty, i.e., an equity court will grant relief, "if
the mortgagee's conduct indicates a waiver or amounts to bad faith, fraud, or
unconscionable conduct .. " Volkmer, supra note 6, at 786. See e.g., Tucker v.
Pulaski Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725 (1972); Baltimore Life
Ins. Co. v. Ham, 15 Ariz. App. 79, 486 P.2d 190 (1971), rev. denied, 108 Ariz. 192, 494
P.2d 1322 (1972); Clark v. Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583 (Fla. App. 1970). Utilization of
the penalty doctrine to protect against enforcement of the due-on-sale clause is unneces-
sary, however, since "the restraints doctrine in this area would represent a natural
development of the doctrine as expanded by Minderhout and refined by Pellerito and
Lemon." Volkmer, supra note 6, at 803.
42. 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973).
43. Id. at 531.
44. Id.
45. Comment, supra note 10, at 1124.
46. Id. at 1127.
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wake of Nichols seems likely. Michigan has been a prominent juris-
diction in the application of the restraints on alienation doctrine to real
property security interests. Sloman v. Cutler,47 the landmark case in
upholding the validity of nonassignment provisions in land contracts,
and the cases first adopting the flexible approach to restraints on
alienation, Pellerito v. Weber" and Lemon v. Nicolai,49 have all been
Michigan decisions.
By its decision in Nichols, Michigan has become one of the few
states to apply the flexible approach to restraints on alienation to the
due-on-sale clause. The Michigan court was only the second to actual-
ly hold that the enforcement of a due-on-sale clause constituted an
invalid restraint on alienation, and Nichols represents the first case in
which the defendant-mortgagee was enjoined from foreclosure on the
ground that enforcement of the clause would be an unreasonable
restraint. Nichols provides support for the view that the mortgagee will
be allowed to exercise the due-on-sale clause to his benefit only where
a minimal quantum of restraint is imposed on the mortgagor's ability to
alienate his land.
CLIFFORD M. WIENER
47. 258 Mich. 372, 242 N.W. 735 (1932).
48. 22 Mich. App. 242, 177 N.W.2d 236 (1970).
49. 33 Mich. App. 646, 190 N.W.2d 549 (1971).
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Nichols v. Ann Arbor Federal Savings & Loan Association,
73 Mich. App. 163, 250 N.W.2d 804,
appeal denied, 400 Mich. 844 (1977).
Lending institutions have commonly included a provision in mort-
gage contracts allowing them to accelerate the maturity of a loan upon
the alienation of the secured property.' Lenders use such due-on-sale
clauses to adjust the overall yield of their loan portfolios toward the
prevailing interest rates. 2 This practice may be severely limited be-
cause of recent state court decisions, including a Michigan Court of
Appeals' decision in Nichols v. Ann Arbor Federal Savings & Loan
Association .' The Michigan court held that the due-on-sale clause was
unenforceable as an unreasonable restraint on the borrower's ability to
alienate where the sole basis for enforcement was the lender's interest
in maintaining his loan portfolio at current interest rates. Although the
Nichols court emphasized its concern for the interests of the borrower,
it is the contention of this writer that the court's decision will upset the
conventional mortgage market at the expense of both lending institu-
tions and home buyers.
In Nichols, the John Adams Mortgage Company held a mortgage,
containing a due-on-sale clause, on certain real estate owned by Her-
1. In 1970, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation conducted a survey of
conventional mortgages (principally those used by savings and loan associations) and
found that over two-thirds of such mortgages included due-on-sale clauses. Federal
Home Loan Bank Bd. Adv. Op. No. 75-647, at 29 (July 30, 1975) (entered in Schott v.
Mission Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, No. 75-366 WMB (C.D. Cal., filed Feb. 4, 1975)).
2. Although some contend that the due-on-sale clause was originally used by
lenders to protect their security interests, e.g., Valensi, The Due on Sale Clause-A
Dissenting Opinion 45 L.A.B. BULL. 121 (1970), most authorities agree that it was
conceived primarily to combat the rising interest rates of the 1960's. E.g., FEDERAL
NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, PUBLIC MEETING ON CONVENTIONAL MORTGAGE
FORMS, S. Doc. No. 92-21, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 147 (1971) (Statement of Haydon M.
Calvert, Senior Vice-President, Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association, Salt
Lake City, Utah) [hereinafter cited as FNMA PUBLIC MEETING].
3. 73 Mich. App. 163, 250 N.W.2d 804, appeal denied, 400 Mich. 844 (1977). The
due-on-sale clause discussed in Nichols stated:
That the mortgage shall become due and payable forthwith at the option of
the Mortgagee if there shall be any change in the ownership of the mortgaged
property then and in such event, the aforesaid principal sum with accrued
interest shall, at the option of the Mortgagee, become due and payable im-
mediately . ...
Brief for Appellant at Exhibit D-2, Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 73
Mich. App. 163, 250 N.W.2d 804, appeal denied, 400 Mich. 844 (1977).
For other state court decisions concerning due-on-sale clauses, see e.g., Baltimore
Life Ins. Co. v. Harn, 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190 (1971), rev. denied, 108 Ariz. 192,
494 P.2d 1322 (1972); Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 481
S.W.2d 725 (1972); Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n. 12 Cal.3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169,
116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974); accord, DeMey v. Joujon-Rouche, 133 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1976)
(opinion omitted at 63 Cal. App. 3d 178).
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bert and Virginia Kempf. 4 The mortgage company assigned the mort-
gage to the defendant, the Ann Arbor Federal Savings & Loan Associ-
ation (the Bank). 5 Approximately six months later, the Kempfs sold
the property to Charles and Laverne Nichols on an installment land
contract without the Bank's approval. 6 The Bank accelerated the mort-
gage debt,7 and when the Kempfs did not pay off the loan, the Bank
commenced foreclosure proceedings. 8
The Kempfs and the Nichols filed independent suits seeking to
enjoin the foreclosure and their actions were consolidated for trial. 9
The trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment
and the court of appeals affirmed. 10 The Michigan Supreme Court
denied leave to appeal."
The court of appeals saw the problem presented by Nichols as
twofold. First, was the due-on-sale clause a restraint on alienation?
Second, if so, was it reasonable under the circumstances, so as to be
enforceable under Michigan law?' 2
In answering the first question, the Nichols court noted that the
due-on-sale clause does not fall within the Restatement of Property's
definition 13 of a restraint on alienation. In spite of this, the court found
that it "directly and fundamentally burdens a mortgagor's ability to
alienate as surely and directly as the classical promissory restraint. As
such, the due-on-sale clause is truly a direct restraint insofar as the
4. Brief for Appellant at 1, Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 73
Mich. App. 163, 250 N.W.2d 804, appeal denied, 400 Mich. 844 (1977).
5. Id.
6. 73 Mich. App. at 164, 250 N.W.2d at 805.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 400 Mich. 844 (1977).
12. 73 Mich. App. at 168, 250 N.W.2d at 806.
13. (1) A restraint on alienation, as that phrase is used in this Restatement is
an attempt by an otherwise effective conveyance or contract to cause a later
conveyance
(a) to be void; or
(b) to impose contractual liability on the one who makes the later convey-
ance when such liability results from a breach of an agreement not to
convey; or
(c) to terminate or subject to termination all or a part of the property
interest conveyed.
(2) If a restraint on alienation is of the type described in Subsection (!),
Clause (a), it is a disabling restraint.
(3) If a restraint on alienation is of the type described in Subsection (1),
Clause (b), it is a promissory restraint.
(4) If a restraint on alienation is of the type described in Subsection (1),
Clause (c), it is a forfeiture restraint.
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 404, at 2381 (1944).
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category of direct restraints can be articulated."1 14 For support, the
court cited several cases from other jurisdictions which also adopted
this position. 15
In opposition to this conclusion, the Bank sought to distinguish the
cases on which the court ultimately relied16 by contending that the due-
on-sale clause did not prohibit the Kempfs from alienating their prop-
erty, but instead merely "furnish[ed] a measure of the duration of the
loan contract between the mortgagor and the mortgagee.' 17 This
argument is superficial and specious. Surely the mortgagor can alien-
ate his property, but what is crucial here is not whether the clause
expressly precludes the mortgagor from alienating, but whether it
operates to inhibit him from doing so, and thus functions as a classic
restraint on alienation.
In the case where a mortgagor transfers an interest in property
which is the subject of a due-on-sale provision, the mortgagee may
accelerate the mortgage debt, converting a long-term installment debt
into one which is immediately due and payable in full. In this way, the
due-on-sale clause is like a promissory restraint, where alienation
constitutes a default on the agreement, entitling the mortgagee to full
and immediate payment. In each case, the provision functions to
restrain or deter alienation mainly because it causes the mortgagor to
lose the principal benefit of the mortgage agreement-the ability to
repay the loan on a deferred installment basis. Thus, where the mort-
gagee chooses to accelerate the mortgagor's indebtedness, the practical
effect of a due-on-sale clause is the same as a promissory restraint, and
the court was proper in so treating it.
Normally, however, rather than incur the cost of a probable fore-
closure proceeding and the delay of relending the proceeds, the mort-
gagee will waive his right to call the loan on the condition that the
14. 73 Mich. App. at 166, 250 N.W.2d at 805 (quoting Volkmer, The Application of
the Restraint on Alienation Doctrine to Real Property Security Interests, 58 IowA L. REV.
747, 774 (1973)).
15. Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 633 (1974); Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr.
505 (1964); Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d 1240
(1973); Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61111. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d 1 (1975).
16. Lemon v. Nicolai, 33 Mich. App. 646, 190 N.W.2d 549 (1971); Pellerito v.
Weber, 22 Mich. App. 242, 177 N.W.2d 236 (1970). Both Lemon and Pellerito involved
installment land contracts containing clauses requiring the vendor's written consent
before the vendee could assign his interest. These provisions fell under the Restatement
definition of a restraint on alienation. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 404(l)(b), (c)
(1944).
17. Brief for Appellant at 5, Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 73
Mich. App. 163, 250 N.W.2d 804, appeal denied, 400 Mich. 844 (1977).
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mortgagor or vendee accept an increase in the interest rate. 18 Since the
elimination of the bargain rate will reduce the selling price of the
property, the mortgagor will be less willing to alienate. Thus, even
where the mortgagee does not enforce the due-on-sale clause but
instead uses it as a means to obtain a higher interest rate, the court was
justified in holding that the provision constituted a restraint on aliena-
tion.
The court decided the second issue, whether the due-on-sale clause
was a reasonable restraint on alienation, by applying the rule it had
developed in Pellerito v. Weber'9 and Lemon v. Nicolai.20 These
cases held that nonassignment provisions in land contracts21 were
unenforceable as unreasonable restraints on alienation unless the seller
could demonstrate that the purchaser's transfer to a third party created
a risk of waste, impairment, or loss of the security. 22 In Nichols, the
Bank simply argued that its interest in maintaining its portfolio at the
prevailing interest rates was sufficient to allow the enforcement of the
provision. 23 The court rejected this argument and followed the
Pellerito-Lemon rule, holding the due-on-sale clause unenforce-
able, absent a showing that the sale created a threat to the Bank's
security. 24
18. Of course, if interest rates have declined, mortgagees, as a rule, will not call the
loan. Under such circumstances, no restraint on alienation arises.
19. 22 Mich. App. 242, 177 N.W.2d 236 (1970).
20. 33 Mich. App. 646, 190 N.W.2d 549 (1971).
21. Until Nichols, Michigan courts had never addressed the question of the validity
of restraints on alienation in mortgages. Thus the court of appeals had to rely on its
former treatment of restraints on alienation in land contracts.
22. Lemon v. Nicolai, 33 Mich. App. 646, 649, 190 N.W.2d 549, 550(1971); Pellerito
v. Weber, 22 Mich. App. 242, 245, 177 N.W.2d 236, 238 (1970). See 73 Mich. App. at
167-68, 250 N.W.2d at 806.
23. Brief for Appellant at 7-19, Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 73
Mich. App. 163, 250 N.W.2d 804, appeal denied, 400 Mich. 844 (1977).
24. 73 Mich. App. at 173,250 N.W.2d at 809. In dictum, the court expressed concern
that a due-on-sale clause often does not reveal its purpose to the mortgagor. Id. at
172-73, 250 N.W.2d at 808-09. The Federal Loan Bank Board has shared this
concern and as of July 31, 1976, it was the responsibility of every federally chartered
savings and loan institution to ensure that the "rights and obligations of the contracting
parties . . . [were] fully and specifically disclosed to borrowers." 12 C.F.R. § 556.9(a)
(1977).
While some mortgagees may not adequately explain the workings of the due-on-sale
clause to their mortgagors, this was not the case in Nichols. Herbert Kempf was a realtor
who purported to purchase the loan for residential use, Brief for Appellant at Exhibit
B-I, B-3, Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163, 250
N.W.2d 804, appeal denied, 400 Mich. 844 (1977), but apparently used it for commercial
purposes. He bought the property for $33,950, id. at Exhibit A-I, with a $30,500 loan,
acquired at an interest rate of 8%, to be paid back in monthly installments of $223.80. Id.
at Exhibit E-1. Approximately six months later, the Kempfs sold the property on an
installment land contract to the Nichols for $46,000 plus interest. The Nichols agreed to
pay $6,000 down and installments of $223.00 per month at an interest rate of 8 1/2%,
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To fully understand the significance of the case, it is necessary to
examine why the Bank did not argue that the transfer to the Nichols
impaired its security. The court would have then been faced with
issues of both law and fact, and the Bank might well have prevailed on
the latter. 25 Yet, the Bank did not wish to give the court an out and
have the case resolved on a factual point. Thus, its strategy was to
press the legal issue and attempt to establish a more useful precedent-
a right to enforce a due-on-sale clause solely on the basis of the Bank's
interest in upgrading its loan portfolio. 26
This issue was one of first impression under Michigan law; how-
ever, courts of other jurisdictions had already faced the problem, with
mixed results. 27 After considering several of these opinions, the
Nichols court approved the reasoning of the California Supreme Court
in Tucker v. Lassen Savings & Loan Association,28 which stated that
"the clause can be validly enforced only when the beneficiary-obligee
can demonstrate a threat to one of his legitimate interests sufficient to
justify the restraint on alienation inherent in its enforcement.''29 In a
footnote, the California court had "reject[ed] the suggestion that a
lender's interest in maintaining its portfolio at current interest rates
justifie[d] the restraint imposed by the exercise of a 'due-on' clause
upon the execution of an installment land contract.' '30 But the Tucker
rising to 9 1/2% when and as often as the Nichols were in default. Id. at Exhibit F-I.
It is interesting to note that, in effect, the Nichols are leasing the property from the
Kempfs. This is because the first month's interest ($283.33) was greater than the monthly
installment ($223.00). Consequently, the amount of interest remaining due will be per-
petually increasing. Unless the Nichols could afford to pay $307.57 per month (the
installment required to pay $40,000 at 8 1/2% amortized over 30 years), they would default
on the contract when its term expires. Id. at Exhibit F-1, F-2. Thus, at $223.00 per
month, the effect of the transaction is a lease rather than a sale.
25. Interview with Donald L. Bramlage, Jr., counsel for the Nichols (June 13, 1977);
Interview with Alvin P. Lipnik, Vice-President and General Counsel for the Ann Arbor
Federal Savings & Loan Association (June 14, 1977).
26. Interview with Alvin P. Lipnik, supra note 25.
27. For examples of cases opposing enforcement under these circumstances, see
Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Ham, 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190 (1971), rev. denied, 108
Ariz. 192,494 P.2d 1322 (1972); Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849,
481 S.W.2d 725 (1972); Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d
1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
For examples of cases supporting enforceability in this setting, see Malouff v.
Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d 1240 (1973); Gunther v. White,
489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973); Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire Works,
71 Wis. 2d 531, 239 N.W.2d 20 (1976). Accord, Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976); Miller v. Pacific First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 86 Wash. 2d 401, 545 P.2d 546 (1976).
28. 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
29. Id. at 639, 526 P.2d at 1175, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
30. Id. at 639-40 n.10, 526 P.2d at 1175-76 n.10, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639-40 n.10.
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court only explained that a due-on-sale clause imposes a more severe
restraint in the case of a transfer by installment land contract than in the
case of an outright sale. 3 1 It did not evaluate the effect on the lender of
preventing him from adjusting his portfolio to the current market rates
to determine if it outweighed the harm from the restraint on alienation
inflicted on the borrower. Such an analysis is crucial, but first it is
important to examine the rule that Nichols adopted.
Certainty is traditionally recognized as a prime objective in fash-
ioning rules of property law. 32 By requiring the mortgagee to demon-
strate that the security has been impaired by a transfer of the property,
the Nichols court violated this precept. Michigan real estate transac-
tions are now clouded with questions as to when a mortgagee's securi-
ty interest might be deemed to have been impaired. Two commentators
have suggested that the security issue may be determined by a rea-
sonableness test based on a loan-to-value ratio. 33 There are two prob-
lems inherent to such a test. First, it would be costly, since at least one
recent appraisal of the security would be necessary. Moreover, it is
likely that more than one would be commissioned, because valuation
31. The court reasoned that in the case of an outright sale, the mortgagor-vendor
receives full payment for his property at the time of the transfer and should be able to
pay off his entire debt when the mortgagee enforces the due-on-sale clause. Thus, the
restraint on alienation is slight. On the other hand, if an installment land contract is used,
the mortgagor-vendor receives a relatively small down payment from the vendee and will
therefore have little cash on hand from the transaction, when the mortgagee enforces the
due-on-sale clause. When the amount due on the loan is substantial, the mortgagor's
ability to alienate will be severely restrained.
The holding of Tucker applies only to situations where the secured property is
transferred by installment land contract. The California court left open the question of
whether "the relatively mild restraint involved in the case of an outright sale" would be
justified by the lender's interest in maintaining its portfolio at current interest rates. Id.
Since Nichols relied heavily on Tucker, it appears that Nichols, like Tucker, will apply
only to cases of installment land contracts. Thus, until there is definitive case or
statutory law to the contrary, Michigan lenders may succeed in enforcing due-on-sale
clauses without a showing of waste or impairment of the security in situations where the
secured property is transferred by outright sale.
32. See, e.g., Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 111. 2d 119, 126, 333
N.E.2d 1, 5 (1975). See also Manning, The Development of Restraints on Alienation
Since Gray, 48 HARV. L. REV. 373, 405 (1935): "Although reasonableness may be a
disguise for saying that the policy of the jurisdiction favors . . . restraints [on
alienation], it is, nonetheless, a dangerous method of approach in a branch of the law
where predictability of judicial result is of paramount importance .... "
33. Under this test, the mortgagee's security interest has been sufficiently impaired
to justify enforcing a due-on-sale clause, when the ratio of the outstanding indebtedness
to the current value of the secured property at the time of the sale by the mortgagor is
substantially higher than the original ratio of the amount loaned to the value of the
property at the inception of the loan. See Note, Due on Sale and Due on Encumbrance
Clauses in California, 7 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 306, 315-19 (1974); Note, Judicial Treatment
of the Due-on-Sale Clause: The Case for Adopting Standards of Reasonableness and
Unconscionability, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1109, 1122-23 (1975).
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would become a central issue, and each party will typically assert that
its appraisal is the accurate one. Second, as with any reasonableness
test, the results will likely turn on the peculiar facts and circumstances
of each case, inviting more litigation and leaving less certainty in the
marketplace. For these reasons, it is evident that the Nichols court has
left Michigan with a burdensome rule for enforcing due-on-sale
clauses.34
The Nichols decision may also create a lack of uniformity in the
treatment of federal and state lending institutions. In 1976, the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board amended its regulations, confirming the right
of federally chartered savings and loan associations to include a due-
on-sale clause in their loan contracts. 35 These clauses are to be
governed exclusively by the terms of the loan agreement. 36 Thus,
federal savings and loan associations need not show a threat to their
security to enforce the clause.
Even if federal associations had this right when the Nichols litiga-
tion commenced, the Bank could not have raised it, since it had been
assigned the mortgage by a state mortgage company, and an assignee
generally can have no greater rights than its assignor.37 But what is
interesting to note is that the Bank may profit by losing its case.
Nichols established a state common law rule prohibiting the enforce-
ment of due-on-sale clauses absent a showing of waste or impairment
of the security. At the same time, federal regulations now allow
34. In Arkansas, which had earlier adopted a rule similar to Nichols, Tucker v.
Pulaski Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725 (1972), lenders have
indicated that the current practice is to allow home buyers to assume existing mortgages
rather than risk going to court over the security issue. Only in the rare situation where
the transfer creates an egregious threat to the security is a lender likely to call the loan.
Interview with David F. Menz of Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, counsel for the Pulaski
Federal Savings & Loan Association (Oct. 13, 1977). It seems that Michigan lenders have
now taken a similar stance. Interview with Alvin P. Lipnik, supra note 25 (Oct. 12,
1977). Thus, the effect of the Nichols rule appears to be substantially the same as if the
due-on-sale clause had been wholly eliminated (except, as previously noted, in situations
where the property has been transferred by outright sale, see note 31 supra).
35. Due-on-sale clauses. A Federal association continues to have the power to
include, as a matter of contract between it and the borrower, a provision in its.
loan instruments whereby the association may, at its option, declare immediate-
ly due and payable all of the sums secured by the association's security
instrument if all or any part of the real property securing the loan is sold or
transferred by the borrower without the association's prior written
consent. . . . [E]xercise by an association of such an option (hereafter called a
due-on-sale clause) shall be governed exclusively by the terms of the contract
between the association and the borrower, and all rights and remedies of the
association and borrower thereto shall be fixed and governed by said contract.
12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(f) (1977).
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., 4 A. CORBIN, CoNTRACTs § 861 (1951 & Supp. 1971).
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federally chartered savings and loan associations to enforce such
clauses solely on the basis of the parties' agreement. Assuming that
both rules may co-exist, the result in Michigan is that federal savings
and loan institutions will be able to enforce due-on-sale clauses in
situations where state chartered banks cannot. For this reason, Ann
Arbor Federal Savings & Loan, as a federally chartered institution,
would not be subject to the rule in Nichols and would accordingly
enjoy an advantage of its state chartered competitors.
Whether this result will actually obtain, however, is not fully
resolved. At present, federal savings and loan associations are await-
ing the outcome of a California case 38 where the issue is whether the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board can preempt state law concerning the
enforceability of the due-on-sale clause. It is submitted that the Board
should prevail, because "courts have upheld the authority of the Board
on the basis that the plenary powers given to the Board in the HOLA
[Home Owners' Loan Act] clearly evidence a Congressional intention
to preempt the field, thus precluding any regulation of federal associa-
tions by state law." ' 39 If the Board does prevail, federal savings and
loan associations may be expected to test the same issue in Michigan. 40
If one does and wins, state chartered lending institutions in Michigan
will become second class citizens-at least until the Nichols rule is
abolished. Should the above scenario occur, lenders will face a period
of uncertainty and, in the end, the home buyer will suffer, because
state regulated lenders will likely attempt to charge higher interest rates
to compensate for the absence of a readily enforceable due-on-sale
clause. 4
1
38. People v. Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, No. 76-0162-HP (C.D. Cal., filed
Jan. 14, 1976).
39. Lyons Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 377 F. Supp. 11, 17
(N.D. 11. 1974). E.g., Myers v. Beverly Hills Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 499 F.2d 1145,
1147 (9th Cir. 1974); People v. Coast Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311,319 (S.D.
Cal. 1951).
40. Federal savings and loan associations in Michigan may be reluctant to test the
preemption issue until they can get an accurate interpretation of 12 C.F.R. §
545.6-11 (g)(l)(i) (1977) which states that a federal association may not invoke a due-on-
sale clause because of the "creation of a lien or other encumbrance subordinate to the
association's security instrument." Until such an interpretation, federal associations in
Michigan may have to limit their use of the due-on-sale clause to the situation where the
secured property is transferred by outright sale. The same regulation prevents a federally
chartered lender from invoking the due-on-sale clause because of a "creation of a
purchase money security interest for household appliances; [a] transfer by devise,
descent, or by operation of law upon the death of a joint tenant; or [a] grant of any
leasehold interest of three years or less not containing an option to purchase." 12 C.F.R.
§ 545.6-1 l(g)(1)(ii)-(iv) (1977). Furthermore, Board policy suggests that a federal associ-
ation not exercise the provision when the transfer is made to immediate family or when
the existing borrower faces extreme hardship. Id. at § 556.9(c).
41. See text accompanying note 54 infra.
Lending institutions commonly sell some of their mortgages in the secondary market
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The most immediate effect of the Nichols decision is that it
prevents Michigan lending institutions from using the due-on-sale
clause to upgrade their loan portfolios. While some suggest that the use
of variable rate mortgages may be a more equitable solution to the
changing money market,42 this practice is unlawful in Michigan.4 3
to generate additional funds for residential loans. Without a readily enforceable due-on-
sale clause, Michigan mortgages will be less attractive to secondary loan purchasers than
mortgages with a more viable due-on-sale provision. Thus, Michigan lenders will be at a
competitive disadvantage in this secondary market, resulting in a reduction of new funds
available for home loans in Michigan. See, e.g., Federal Home Loan Bank Bd. Adv. Op.
No. 75-647, at 28-34 (July 30, 1975) (entered in Schott v. Mission v. Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, No. 75-366 WMB (C.D. Cal., filed Feb. 4, 1975)). See also Pratt, The Due on Sale
Clause in California and Federally Chartered Savings and Loan Associations, at 23-25
(submitted in Schott v. Mission Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, No. 75-366 WMB (C.D. Cal.,
filed Feb. 4, 1975)).
42. See, e.g., FNMA PUBLIC MEETING, supra note 2, at 148; Note, Judicial Treat-
ment of the Due-on-Sale Clause: The Case for Adopting Standards of Reasonableness
and Unconscionability, 27 STAN. L. RaV. 1109, 1130 (1975). See also Brief for Appellee
at 9, Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163,250 N.W.2d 804,
appeal denied, 400 Mich. 844 (1977).
The advantage of variable rate mortgages is that the ability of the mortgagee to vary
the interest rate (within prescribed statutory limits) throughout the duration of the loan
permits him to offer a more competitive initial rate. In addition, because it allows for the
possibility of interest rate reductions, borrowers may be more willing to accept a
relatively high initial rate where they will be able to benefit from later downward
movements in the prevailing rate without having to refinance the transaction. In periods
of inflation, variable rate mortgages are well suited to borrowers who presently earn a
modest income, but expect their income to increase thereby enabling them to afford
subsequent increases in their mortgage rate. Of course, the variable rate mortgage is a
death trap for someone on a fixed income.
Several states have proscribed variable rate mortgages. See, e.g. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
74, § 4(d)(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 334.01(1966); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 9, § 41(a) (1970). Presumably, this is because their legislatures have decided that too
often the mortgagor lacks the financial capacity to weather the interest obligations of a
variable rate provision and the foresight or bargaining power to preventits inclusion in
his mortgage contract.
43. "[N~o. . . mortgage. . . shall provide that the rate of interest initially effective
may be increased for any reason whatsoever." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 438.31c(2)
(Supp. 1976). In addition, federally chartered savings and loan associations are pro-
hibited from using variable rate mortgages by 12 C.F.R. § 541.14(a) (1977): "[N]o
required payment after the first payment shall be more . . . than any preceding pay-
ment." When a mortgagee uses the due-on-sale clause in order to obtain a higher interest
rate, he drafts a new mortgage agreement and thus circumvents § 438.31c(2) and
§ 541.14(a).
By prohibiting variable rate mortgages, Michigan, in effect, has mandated that its
lending institutions insure their mortgagors against unexpected increases in interest
rates. Savings and loan institutions generally acquire their funds from short-term sources
(e.g. passbook savings and savings certificates) and invest them principally in long-term
mortgages. Where variable rate mortgages are prohibited, the lender must determine the
interest rate on the long-term loan by estimating what the interest rate will be for short-
term capital over the life of the long-term loan. As a result, these lending institutions
must depend on estimates of future interest rates and take the risk that these estimates
may turn out to be too low. In compelling mortgagees to assume this risk, a prohibition of
variable rate mortgages insures the mortgagor that the interest rate payable on his loan
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Thus, by restricting the use of the due-on-sale clause, the Nichols
court has left Michigan lenders without a means of adjusting their
portfolios to the current market rates.
The effect of this situation on those subject to the Nichols rule
depends upon the general movement of all interest rates. If mortgage
rates decrease, the effect will be negligible. Under such conditions,
home buyers will typically not assume existing mortgages, because
they will be able to obtain financing elsewhere at lower rates. How-
ever, when mortgage rates are rising, home buyers will assume exist-
ing mortgages in order to retain the lower interest rate and, conse-
quently, the average prepayment period (or life) of the mortgages in a
bank's portfolio will increase.44 As a result, lending institutions will
have a greater number of low-interest loans than they would otherwise
hold. The harm from this arises out of the fact that savings and loan
institutions borrow on a short-term basis to support their long-term
lending activities. Thus, during periods of rising interest rates, the cost
of lending capital increases directly with the rise in short-term interest
rates. Yet, at the same time, due to the greater number of low-yield
loans in their mortgage loan portfolios, the institutions' overall yield
will increase more slowly. The result is the reduction or elimination of
earnings for the period of rising interest rates. In order to compensate
for this, lenders must increase current mortgage rates more than would
normally be required to offset their own increased costs.4 5 In this way,
present and future borrowers pay- the added cost of preserving bargain
rates for those home buyers who assume low-interest mortgages. 46
will not be affected by subsequent increases in the prevailing market rates. But, like any
insurance, this protection against increasing interest rates comes only with a "pre-
mium," which in this case is the incremental percentage of the interest rate charged by
the lender to compensate him for any unexpected rise in interest rates. Since, in the
absence of § 438.31c(2) and § 541.14(a), rising interest rates would adversely affect all
mortgagors, it seems equitable that all mortgagors pay a premium for the protection that
the law provides. The same cannot be said for a statute (or case law) invalidating the due-
on-sale clause. Such a statute would benefit only those mortgagors who attempt to
alienate their property, yet all mortgagors would have to bear the cost of this insurance,
since lending institutions would be forced to raise their interest rates on new loans to
compensate for their inability to adjust their portfolios to the current rates. See text
accompanying notes 47-49, infra.
44. Of course, the result will be the same, when the buyer takes subject to the
existing mortgage. For example, in Nichols, the vendees purchased the property on an
installment land contract, and the property remained subject to the Kempf mortgage.
45. See Opinion of the Office of Economic Research of the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board on the Revocation of the "Due on Sale Clause" in the State of California,
Federal Home Loan Bank Bd. Adv. Op. No. 75-647, Exhibit 1, at 3-5 (July 30, 1975)
(entered in Schott v. Mission Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, No. 75-366 WMB (C.D. Cal.,
filed Feb. 4, 1975)).
46. Although the buyer assumes the mortgage at a "bargain rate," it is normally the
seller who benefits, since he can charge an inflated price for his property due to its low
mortgage rate.
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The following hypothetical may illustrate the problem more
graphically.47 Two $10,000 mortgages, one with a due-on-sale clause
and the other without, are closed the same day at an interest rate of 6%
with a term of twenty-five years. When the properties are sold four
years later, the loan having the due-on-sale clause is called and the
interest rate is raised to 7%. Upon the sale of the properties three years
hence, the due-on-sale clause is again invoked and the interest rate
increased to 7 3/4%. After twenty-five years, the return from the loan
with the due-on-sale clause would amount to $21,535.80, 48 while the
payments from the other loan would be $19,329.00. To have generated
that same $21,535.80 from the loan without the due-on-sale clause, the
mortgagee would have had to charge the original borrower an interest
rate of approximately 7 1/4% instead of the 6% actually charged. 49
Perhaps the simplest way to analyze the problem that Nichols
raises is to ask: who should benefit from an increase in interest rates? 50
If the mortgagor is allowed to use his low interest rate to enhance the
47. Pratt, The Due on Sale Clause in California and Federally Chartered Savings and
Loan Associations, at 20-21 (submitted in Schott v. Mission Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n.,
No. 75-366 WMB (C.D. Cal., filed Feb. 4, 1975)).
48. The Pratt study reports a different figure for the total amount generated by the
due-on-sale clause. This is due to an apparent typographical error at one stage of the
Pratt hypothetical. Id. at Table 4.
49. This increase does not take into account the risk factor. The above hypothetical
illustrates with an after-the-fact analysis that the mortgagee would have to raise his
interest rate approximately 1 1/4% to compensate for its inability to call the loan. As a
practical matter, a mortgagee must set his interest rate before making a loan. To insure
himself against losing money because of an estimate that is too low, the mortgagee will
charge an increment to the expected interest rate. Thus, in the hypothetical, the mort-
gagee of the loan without the due-on-sale clause would charge an interest rate of 7 1/4%
plus the increment.
50. Several courts have reasoned that a mortgagee should be able to take advantage
of rising interest rates on the theory that a mortgagor has a like ability to profit from
declining rates by paying off his loan and refinancing elsewhere at the lower rate. E.g.,
Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 626-27, 224 S.E.2d 580, 585
(1976). The Nichols court rejected this argument. It reasoned that because the promis-
sory note signed by the Kempfs included a prepayment penalty they were precluded
from refinancing their mortgage. 73 Mich. App. at 172, 250 N.W.2d at 808. This is not
necessarily so; it depends upon the size of both the prepayment penalty and the drop in
interest rates. The mortgagor will likely be willing to pay off his loan and refinance
elsewhere if the drop in interest rates is sufficient to offset the penalty and overcome the
inertia to refinance. This might often happen in Michigan where prepayment fees are
limited to 1% of the amount of the prepayment. Furthermore, no prepayment fee may be
charged more than three years from the date of the loan. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
438.31c(2)(c) (Supp. 1976). For the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's limitation on
prepayment penalties, see 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-12(b) (1977).
Most lenders admit that the purpose of the prepayment penalty is not to cover the
cost of originating the loan, but to deter borrowers from refinancing elsewhere, when
interest rates decline. E.g., FNMA PUBLIC MEETING, supra note 2, at 196 (statement of
Franklin Hardinge, Jr., California Savings and Loan League). Thus, it is suggested that
the prepayment provision should be used to penalize only those borrowers who refi-
nance and remain on the property, and not those who are forced to move.
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marketability of the property, only he (and possibly the vendee) will
profit. 51 On the other hand, if the mortgagee is permitted to accelerate
the loan and relend at the prevailing rate, he presumably will be able to
maintain lower interest rates on new loans, and the benefit will be
spread among all home buyers.52
In general, most who argue against the due-on-sale clause seem to
feel they are taking a pro-consumer stance.5 3 The Federal Home Loan
Bank Board disagrees. In an advisory opinion, it stated:
[the] invalidation of the "due-on-sale" clause will enable a
certain class of sellers to make a fortuitous profit on the sale
of homes with relatively recent low-interest loans (and to sell
them more rapidly than other sellers in a tight money mar-
ket). But it is the Board's firm conviction that such profits
will be achieved only at the expense of the general home-
buying public, because interest rates on new loans are most
likely to be raised to offset the very substantial loss of
savings and loan income flowing directly from elimination of
the "due-on-sale" clause, and elimination of the "due-on-
sale" clause will decrease the supply of housing funds which
otherwise would be available. Therefore, viewing consumer
interests from the broader perspective, it is the Board's
opinion that elimination of the "due-on-sale" clause, at best,
will have only a marginal overall consumer benefit, but un-
doubtedly will cause widespread hardship to the general
home-buying public.54
Although the Nichols court only intended to restrict the due-on-
sale clause, and not to eliminate it, the effect will be substantially the
same as an absolute bar5g-an increase in interest rates on new loans
and a concomitant decrease in conventional mortgage funds. In addi-
tion, there will be less certainty as well as a potential lack of uni-
formity between state and federal lending practices. And, it is submitt-
ed that although lenders will suffer initially, the ultimate loss will be
sustained primarily by the very home buyer whose interests the
Nichols court sought to protect.
JOHN L. RESOR
51. Furthermore, such a policy may encourage borrowers to speculate.
52. One may contend that spreading rewards no one, since once the benefit is
distributed, it is too insignificant to be meaningful, and that therefore, it is better to allow
one person to receive a windfall. This argument ignores the fact that absent spreading,
one marginal home buyer may be priced out of the housing market.
53. See, e.g., FNMA PUBLIC MEETING, supra note 2, at 116 (statement of John A.
Spanogle, Jr., Public Interest Research Group); Note, Judicial Treatment of the Due-on-
Sale Clause: The Case for Adopting Standards of Reasonableness and Unconscionabili-
ty, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1109 (1975).
54. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd. Adv. Op. No. 75-647, at 37 (July 30, 1975)
(entered in Schott v. Mission Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, No. 75-366 WMB (C.D. Cal.,
filed Feb. 4, 1975)).
55. See note 34 supra.
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